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Acceptance of Uncertainty: uncertainty as a heuristic tool applied to the issue of 
medical errors. 
 
Abstract: This is an exploration of uncertain certainties and certain uncertainties with 
reference to, mainly, systemic approaches to medical errors. 
 
1. Background 
In a universe that is perceived as ordered, unexpected issues inevitably spring up, 
which have put humans on a tightrope walk; they can embrace uncertainty and move 
towards a relativist stance or make efforts to develop tools for the control of the 
conditions of actions and, with it, their effects. The semantic field to which 
uncertainty (being of indeterminate time or occurrence) belongs reflects this situation. 
Words such as dubious, obscure, hesitant to suspend, interrupt, err, mistake, peril, 
chance, stake, unsafe and safe as well as empiric, adventure, danger, dominion and 
variability are related to the feeling of insecurity and the desire for the right 
knowledge in order to do what is right (etymonline). Certainty, the antonym, promises 
safety, and control and, with it, appears to be preferable. What induces insecurity and 
fear then needs to be overcome or eliminated. Organization, government and legal 
rules, science and technology are some of the means to this end, however 
unreachable.  
The discourse on the ethics of errors in the medical field has taken place in 
this context and has necessarily been shaped by the desire to avoid any unnecessary 
risks and to not harm but benefit patients. Guided by the idea that, when human lives 
are concerned, there should be no room for error, the focus has mainly been on 
outcome control and causal analysis of errors. Central to these efforts have been 
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improved standards of care, technical equipment, expertise, and management of the 
medical caregiver-patient relationship in order to increase trust in and reputation of 
the health care system as well as to lower the costs for healthcare providers, patients, 
and society as a whole. More recently, in addition to retroactive “damage control,” 
models of prospective continuous quality improvement (CQI) and no-fault liability 
have been developed, that is, a more process-oriented approach, particularly with 
regard to disclosure measures and the development of a higher level of responsiveness 
and accountability both on individual and health care system levels (Sharpe, 2015; 
Leape, 2001; Rubin & Zoloth, 2000). Moreover, the need has been articulated to not 
only focus on risk prevention and management but also on overcoming “white-coat 
silence” (Gawande, 2002, pp. 70-74, 94-106; Groopman, 2008, pp. 1-25, 272-279). 
The professional culture in the medical field needs to change from one of self-
regulation and blame or silence with regards to mistakes to a culture of self- and 
external regulation, disclosure, and support (Sharpe, 2004, 2015; Rosner, Berger, 
Karg et al., 2000; Rubin & Zoloth, 2000; Runciman, Merry &Walton, 2007; Wu, 
McCay, Levinson et al., 2014; Leape, 2001). This has gone hand in hand with 
reacknowledging that medicine is an “uncertain art” (Nuland, 2008) in the pursuit of 
which the health care professional needs to weigh probabilities and develop a 
tolerance toward the inevitability of uncertainty. In this context, practitioners, such as 
C. Wellbery (2009, 2010), J. Groopman (2008), S. B. Nuland (2008), B. Lown (1999) 
and A. Gawande (2002, 2015) articulated that uncertainty should not be reduced to a 
necessary evil but welcomed as an opportunity to deepen the relationship to the 
patient and consider alternative possibilities. Furthermore, both medical personnel and 
patients are coping with angsts and uncertainties, which factor into the dynamics of 
their relationship. Sharpe, Leape, Bosk, Scofield, and Chambers went even further 
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and broadened MacIntyre’s and Gorowitz’s idea of a theory of medical fallibility 
(1975) in order to express a general need for society to alter its discourse on 
uncertainty and errors in health care – that uncertainty and errors cannot be 
eliminated; they are an imminent part of what we consider scientific and 
technological progress, although reducible and manageable. Others again, such as the 
physicians M. and Ch. Witte, focused specifically on the limits of our knowledge, the 
unknown that exists within the known and linked to it. They built on the results of 
Ignorance Studies (theories of non-knowledge) and Nepistemologies, that is, theories 
of how new knowledge come into being (Root-Bernstein, 2003).  
By focusing on the morphology of change under the condition of the 
interrelatedness of properties of objects, co-existence and co-evolution of 
environments and their organisms, New Materialist and Object-Oriented Ontology 
perspectives are also accentuating the need for a non-dichotomizing, “normalizing” 
approach to knowledge and technology- related uncertainty. They recognize that we 
have “only” the certain certainties of best scientific evidence, which are tied to and 
accompanied by uncertainties. Furthermore, if nothing is fully itself, a particular 
ethical perspective needs to be taken, as Timothy Morton, for instance, articulated. He 
tied interconnectedness not just to the need to learn “to live in the shadow of 
wrongness” but also to an ethical impetus, the need to care about far away and 
seemingly strange and foreign organisms (Morton, 2010, p. 13). Approaches, which 
reduce uncertainty to a solely epistemological problem (Djugolbecovic in Adams, 
Tomori, & Bennett, 2001), oversimplify the issue. Already in the 1970s the ethicist 
Hans Jonas had suggested to apply a Precautionary Principle in case of the absence 
of scientific consensus on whether development and implementation of a new 
technology could cause severe or irreversible harm to the environment or the public. 
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This approach adds the First Do No Harm principle to the principles of risk 
assessment for situations in which potentially strong hazards might occur for which 
the scientific community lacks in certain information. As implicated above, these 
risks are grounded in the fact that, because of the interconnectedness of things, all our 
models of whatever part of reality are necessarily reductionist as their complexity and 
interactions with their environments are concerned and, with it, uncertain (imprecise). 
This reductionism is coupled with the system developers’ and, also, politicians’, 
economists’, and financiers’ value choices and the infusion of guiding principles into 
the system and the criteria for the evaluation of its “proper” functioning. 
Consequently, determination and management of hazards should be done in an 
interdisciplinary manner and not just by specialists in the respective field and include 
the perspectives of the layperson who might be exposed to the effects. This again 
warrants transparency of decision-making and non-sensationalist, accurate, and non-
abstruse publication of the findings. WHO discussions of environmental issues as 
public health issues (Martuzzi & Tickner, 2004), for instance, exemplify the latter 
approach.  
The following discussion of medical errors will have to be seen within this 
context of efforts to change the discourses on uncertainty and science. The notion of 
uncertainty will be utilized as a heuristic for making educated guesses about 
phenomena that deserve further research with regards to medical errors. This 
approach expands on Witte’s (1995) understanding of ignorance, which concerns: 
- what we do not know (a known unknown that can be researched or an unknown 
known, that is, existing knowledge one is not aware of); 
- what we think we know but don’t;  
- what we take for granted but don’t really know; 
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- what we don’t want to know. There is also what we just ignore (because of the 
particular focus of a study); 
- what the scientific community cannot agree upon and that requires further research; 
- what we are used to seeing and portraying in the particular ways that are typical of a 
cultural or scientific community (Daston & Gallison, 2003, pp. 22-27, 43-48) or a 
subculture; 
- what we denote by using particular concepts whose meaning changes with different 
contextual  configurations and in relation to other concepts and/or ideological frames 
(Freeden, 1996, pp. 44-55, 68-77, 86-90; Rubin & Zoloth, pp. 18-20) and  
- what we cannot know, that is, the unknown unknown, the research questions of the 
future, a fundamental uncertainty.  
The following analysis of medical errors will, consequently, start with the known 
knowns and proceed to uncertainties that are related to them, that what is not or 
insufficiently looked at, ignored, not really known, or one-sidedly portrayed. For this 
purpose, the analytical approach will necessarily have to step out of the health care 
system and look at its interactions with its environments.  
 
2. From Known Knowns to Relative Certainties or Uncertainties 
 
2.1. General Knowns 
(1) What catches the public eye are the so-called “never events,” that is, events that 
should never happen (e.g., surgery on the wrong site, body part, or patient or use of 
the wrong drug, or retention of foreign objects in a patient after surgery) as well as the 
perceived great danger of medical malpractice lawsuits. More recently, patient safety 
organizations have paid growing attention to apologies for medical mistakes and 
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patient checklists that are to help the prevention of mistakes. The message, though, 
that medical mistakes or adverse events, and, since 2011 serious reportable events, 
are not rare, does not seem to have made it yet to the broader public. Since the 1990s, 
we know that they are not just a problem of some “bad apples” who lack in 
knowledge or skills; they are endemic and an “industry” or health care system 
problem, although to a high degree preventable (Harvard Medical Study, 1991; To Err 
is Human, 1999). Despite a huge number of quality enhancement programs that 
incorporate a “margin of safety,” many of them coupled with financial incentives for 
error prevention, as in the case of the programs of the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services and Obamacare, the high numbers have subsisted. Because of 
medical care in hospitals that has gone awry an estimated 250,000 deaths per year 
occur, which would make it the third leading cause of death in the U.S. (Makary in 
McMains, 2016) This figure equals roughly 3 crashed Boing 787-200 per day. Even if 
it were “only” 98,000 deaths as To Err is Human approximated (Allen, 2013), the rate 
is rather high for a sector that is expected to heal or help patients manage their 
symptoms but not kill them…  
(2) We also know that there is no unified national data collection and management 
system; transparency laws that regulate reporting differ from state to state. There is 
evidence that the rate of underreporting of medical errors is high; providers are 
reluctant to admit mistakes for fear of repercussions (Kagan & Barnoy, 2013; 
Levinson, 2012; Ruggieri, 2012, pp. 87-90). Based on the possibility to gain data and 
to manage and interfere, the majority of data refers to hospital populations, although, 
nursing home populations and other institutions are sometimes also taken into 
consideration. The majority of medical care happens outside of hospitals, though. 
Also, the figures we have are based on approximations and extrapolations: how can 
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deaths be measured that are due to treatments that should have been provided but 
were not and based on medical records that are not always accurate. More so, under 
“cause of death,” there is no column for medical mistakes (Makary).  
(3) That there is no universally or US-wide accepted definition or taxonomy of 
medical errors and of harm complicates the situation further. (Clarke, 2015, pp. 158-
159; Rubin & Zoloth, pp. 4-112; Runciman, Merry & Walton, pp. 30-51; Berlinger, 
2005). Differences in the understanding of medical errors and harms influence the 
choice of methods to prevent and mitigate errors. And, vice versa, different systems 
models and reporting methodologies shape the understanding of what errors are, what 
is noteworthy to be reported and/or prevented and what is tolerable (e.g., outcome-
oriented reporting, equal utilization of “best practices,” and utilization of disease 
oriented evidence, such as, surrogate markers like blood levels, test results, image 
findings, as well as prescription of particular drugs).  
(4) A bio-medical understanding of errors dominates the discourse, due to its being 
embedded in a repair approach to medicine (“the doc will fix it”), efforts to avoid 
medical malpractice suits and to make health care “businesses” provide service for 
“pay” (Leape; Rubin & Zolot). On an individual level, medical errors are widely seen 
as dependent upon knowledge, skills, and competency (Runciman, Merry & Walton, 
pp. 10, 112-123). They are generally understood as a pursuit of the wrong plan of 
treatment based on the right, wrong or an incomplete diagnosis, or the wrong 
execution of the right plan. In other terms, errors are deviations from or violations of 
reasonable treatment and best practices that lead to adverse effects that can be 
immediate, delayed, cumulative, or long-term (James, 2013), although there is no 
agreement on the time frame.  
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On a systemic level, medical errors are often considered “accidents,” that is, the 
malfunctioning of a system that can either be unforeseeable and, consequently, 
unpreventable (an uncertain uncertainty related to the complexity of the system and 
its interactions that can “happen”) or, in the case of a higher probability of 
occurrence, preventable through safety measures (certain uncertainties with a 
relatively high chance of occurrence). Because these known uncertainties can be 
prevented, their occurrence can ultimately be reduced. 
(5) The persistence of high numbers of adverse events has been linked to a variety of 
factors, such as flaws in the thinking of medical professionals and resulting practices, 
e.g., “defensive medicine” (Lown, 1999, pp. 140-157; Ofri, 2013, pp. 185-193). Other 
important influences are the complex dynamic of a more partnership-oriented 
relationship between patient and medical care provider, difficulties to change 
behaviors, the fracturedness of both the insurance and the health care systems with 
their mesh of private and public sectors and different administrative layers and 
responsibilities, the need to replace outdated information technologies through 
electronic record keeping, the fast-paced implementation of new techniques, 
technologies, and medications, unalike safety standards of different industries, 
proneness to political influences, and dependence on different funding sources 
(Sharpe & Faden, 1998; Sharpe, 2004, 2014).  
(6) As mentioned above, the focus has shifted from outcomes to remedying flaws in 
the process of providing quality care, thereby accepting a moral obligation of both 
individual and “system” to act preemptively to avoid or minimize potential harm to 
patients. One way is to tackle the problem by implementing top-to-bottom measures, 
rules, and regulations and combining these with changes in the cultures of medical 
professionals and management, with full knowledge, though, that both health care and 
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insurance systems are fractured. If “system” is a misnomer (Leape, p. 78), the efforts 
should focus on improvement of care not on system change.  
Those who opted for system change, adopted “industrial efficiency” approaches that 
have been used by other industries, such as aviation and car production, industries, 
which have systematic quality improvement programs and high safety rates. In this 
context, business/service provider/industry – consumer/customer/patient models 
based on complexity, systems analysis and change theories as well as utilitarian cost-
benefit calculations have been applied. For this purpose, experts defined the health 
care “industry” as a complex, open, interconnected and self-adjusting large-scale 
socio-technical or socio-technical-system (Reid, Compton, Grossman & Fanjiang, 
2005; Ravitz, Sapirstein, Pham & Doyle, 2013) or, even a politico-technical system 
(Eveland, 2016). The goal is to transform an underperforming, turbulent system (Bar-
Yam, 2006) via incremental measures into a system that shows as a zero-mistake 
system on the individual level and is cost efficient as a whole. This purpose requires 
to address both the large scale of the different tasks that the system has to address as 
well as its high complexity and to translate the apparent quality problems of the health 
care system into system management and change problems. Considering this, a “one-
size-fits-all” approach won’t do, as the experiences with aviation and engineering 
models show (Stolzer & Goglia, 20015; Ravitz, Sapirstein, Pham, & Doyle). “Fixing 
the system” by applying the right scientific model, more comprehensive data 
collections, and implementing the right management tools (Bar-Yam, pp. 464-465), 
will undoubtedly lead to improvements but not to the “fix” that people normally 
expect from the application of science and technology (Hochschild, Crabill & Sen, 
2012; Kennedy & Overholzer, 2010). Why not? – Because of all the uncertainties that 
systems have to (and therefore do) eliminate; after all they are, to use Feyerabendian 
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terminology, manufactured to make things manageable (1988, 209-210). And the 
creators can neither think nor act in value neutral ways; they are politico-socio-
culturally embedded and part of power games.  
The following will therefore elucidate this in more detail. 
 
2. 2. Uncertainties, that is, unknowns linked to the knowns 
(1) System level 
 To the many variables that determine systems outcomes belong: what is defined as 
system/subsystem level efficiency, well-functioning, health, care, and health care 
quality? What is included in or omitted from the understanding of “industry” or 
“health care system?” Is healing or health maintenance the target or both? – If so, 
value-orientations and treatment goals and expectations are different for chronically 
ill, disabled, or dying people in comparison to other patients; what is considered an 
error, will differ, too. 
To continue with this line of questions: How are the structure of the system, its 
subsystems, and elements defined? What is understood by medical error or mistake 
and how and when are they targeted (Clarke, pp. 160-163, 168)? How is the in-system 
dynamic described and included into systemic models (from interactions between 
members of different professions who are differently positioned in hierarchies to 
patient-care giver partnerships)? If the medical caregiver-patient relationship has 
process character, how it that integrated? Furthermore, assessment of possible risks as 
well as mistakes that have been made depends on the position of the participant in the 
system and, therefore will differ (Dickensen, 2003, p. 147). That is, whether one is a 
patient, the patient’s family, a resident or a more experienced doctor, a nurse, a 
technician, an insurance agent or a company, a hospital/clinic, or a politician who 
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votes for bills or distribution of funds, or someone who represents cases, programs, or 
the industry in the media, makes a difference. Even the distinction between 
“customer” and “patient” can change things. If right treatment includes safe treatment, 
the guideline would be to not deviate from or violate what is defined as reasonable 
treatment that is provided with average skills and follows “best practices.” 
This, however, can only function with a “generic customer” included in a model that 
overlooks cultural, genetic, sex, age, and other differences as well as political 
influences that determine how best practices are defined. Current controversies over 
efficiency and necessity of mammograms, breast and colon cancer tests, over 
radiation exposure through computer tomography, or over beta blocker efficiency for 
post-myocardial infarction and, in general, new medications testify to how political 
influences, changing denotations, and new scientific evidence impact or change not 
only the understanding of best practices but also call for more differentiating and 
individualizing approaches (Prasad et al., 2013; Freedman, 2010; Ricci, Cox, & 
MacDonald, 2006; McKinnon, Cheng, Garside, Masuda, & Miller, 2015). 
What adds to it is that if one of the system goals is to further a more partnership-like 
relationship between medical caretaker and patient or patient advocate, the 
understanding of errors would change, too. What patients (disabled or very young or 
old or facing the end of their lives) see as errors and what they consider proper and 
timely treatment may differ from recommended best practices (Wellberry; Torrey, 
2016). 
Other questions to consider are: What is the greatest or intolerable or 
negligible harm and who has the power to decide what that is and what harm to 
avoid? (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015, pp. 150-153)? Is avoidance of the worst possible 
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outcome in the course of action (Max/Min) desirable and why? How would that be 
negotiated? How can social justice and fair treatment be served under the influence of 
different markets, competition, differing legal rules and regulations, and limited 
resources? – The decision-procedures are not value-neutral either; they are influenced 
by value judgments and power structures. Who needs to know what and when in order 
to make what decision? What are the costs for eliminating or limiting hazard factors? 
What information is considered crucial and, therefore, needs to be passed on to 
whom? Moreover, if there is no evidence of harm that does not mean that we can 
automatically consider a substance or process as harmless. This becomes especially 
important when considering the interactions of whatever is designated as “system,” 
with its environments, i.e., that which seems to lie outside of medical or health care. 
More generally speaking, another bundle of indeterminacies concerning safe and 
quality treatment results from the manifoldness of interactions of the health care 
sector with others.  
(2) Systems and environments 
J. James’s typology of medical errors, although developed to measure in-hospital 
adverse events (2013, pp. 122-124), is quite comprehensive and allows for pointing 
out a variety of uncertainties connected to the working of the system as well as its 
functioning in different environments. James distinguished between five different 
types of errors that may lead to a patient’s immediate or delayed (months or years) 
experience of harm: 1. errors of commission  (wrong action or improper performance 
of the right action), 2. errors of omission (a particular action was not performed that is 
necessary to treat or heal a patient according to institutional protocol or professional 
standard), 3. errors of communication (between health care service providers or 
between provider and patient), 4. contextual errors (disregarding unique and possibly 
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constraining circumstances or conditions of the patient, such as developmental 
disabilities, finances, religious or cultural beliefs) and 5. diagnostic errors, which can 
also lead to (1) or (2). More so, one needs to take into consideration that much 
depends on providing the right tests, diagnoses, and treatments in a timely manner.  
Hospitals and medical institutions and their “customers” are geographically 
situated, though. That means, traffic and road conditions, income levels, availability 
of transportation, previous experiences with medical facilities and care providers, 
cultural beliefs concerning when and what kind of care to seek and, even, a family’s 
immigration status matter for whether and when help is sought as well as for when 
and what kinds of actions are taken on the side of the health caregiver. The racial, 
ethnic, age, income, and educational make-up of the community, shared beliefs and 
experiences need to also be taken into consideration as influences for errors. The 
same is true for what types of medical facilities are available within what time frame 
because this determines test and treatment options, risks because of experience level, 
and opportunities for follow-ups. There is sufficient evidence showing that people in 
rural, poor or medically underserved areas or being African American or Hispanic 
have a higher likelihood of being exposed to non-standard treatment and errors. (2014 
National Healthcare Quality and Disparities Report; Anderson Mattox, 2010; Kirby, 
Taliaferro, & Zuvekas, 2006; Molina, Silva, & Rauscher, 2015) 
And, to stay with the geographical aspect, food availability, air, water and soil 
pollutants belong to the factors that influence people’s health status as well. If 
prevention of avoidable health risks or timely and sufficient response to existing 
dangers are included in the error definition, then omission of such would count as an 
error. Acting on such cases, however, as the example of water pollution in Flint, MI, 
shows, is dependent on the collaboration of and with other governmental agencies, in 
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this case the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality and local, state, and 
federal politicians. More so, our limits of what kinds of chemical substances can be 
found – where and what and in what mixture with what as well as what kinds of 
effects and the nature of such effects (immediate, cumulative, long-term) –is quite 
limited. Patient symptoms can be influenced by such factors, which can easily stay 
unrecognized. But the doctor or practitioner cannot be expected to play environmental 
detective to the degree of the famous TV character, Dr. House.  
Since dealing with errors and possible adverse events requires dealing with 
responsibilities and accountability, a whole other slew of queries raises with reference 
to the moral and legal distribution of responsibilities, culpability, and restitution (from 
apologies and forgiveness to remedying the situation and financial reparation). Even 
if the “originator” or “polluter pays” principle is applied, how does this work in cases 
of collective/compound agents? – Such cases require that responsibilities be 
negotiated, and the negotiation process itself is neither value- nor power-neutral. Is 
there anything like a “weighted” or “collective responsibility” and/or guilt and if so, 
what would that be? – In this case medical ethicists are faced with similar problems as 
military or engineering ethicists who are dealing with the utilization of robots, drones, 
and nanotechnology. Implementation and utilization of technologies in the medical 
sector, including IT (Intelligent Technologies), do not only have the potential to make 
procedures safer but to also create new sources of errors, some of them related to the 
functioning of the technologies themselves, others to the human factor and to how 
possible disturbances in man-technology collaboration can be prevented: If robots are 
used, can these be considered “responsible moral or legal agents?” Technology can 
malfunction (technical, electricity supply, weather or other reasons) or be ill 
calibrated (depending on software or human influence). Software can have glitches or 
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get hacked and, with it, certainly be the cause of adverse events. The same is true for 
new safety measures, such as electronic health records (EHR). Outsourced patient 
record transcription (to people whose understanding of medical English might be 
limited or who are hard to reach in order to double check) adds another failure cause 
(McCann, 2014; Allan, 2015). Even if EHR allows for a more complete picture of 
how certain ailments in particular populations evolve and, with it, the development of 
new algorithms that can help to discover the early onset of these ailments, 
consideration of individual circumstances will still be necessary. Moreover, doctors 
will still have to rely on the information that patients provide or not provide (don’t 
want the doctor to know, don’t consider relevant, or err about). 
Another factor is that choices with regard to technologies, software, or new 
technical components are taking the offers of a great number of suppliers into 
consideration, which bring not only different industry standards but also different 
levels of user-friendliness and fitness to be integrated into the picture. The influences 
of special interests or of financial restrictions play a role, too. In these cases, it is hard 
to determine when and where a mistake happened as well as where what course of 
action to take so as to avoid future mistakes. If the originator principle would be given 
up, mistakes would become part of the functioning of “the system” and individual 
wrongdoing ameliorated. This, however, would veil decision-making processes and 
hinder transparency and organizational learning (Clarke, p. 162), although it would 
protect the reputation of different professions and industries. Using the traditional 
approach of pointing to the human factor and stressing that it is people who 
implement, supervise, and maintain technologies and who train to learn new 
technologies, is also too simplistic. We know that decisions are not made by abstract 
agents but by real life persons with real life interactions that are shaped by mutual 
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perceptions, power games, knowledge, skills and momentary circumstances. 
However, these people function within systems with rules and regulations with 
different organizational climates, goals, professional hierarchies and decision-making 
chains, all of which can collide. Moreover, what it means that a decision is optimal or 
“good-enough under the circumstances” or plain “wrong,” and what kinds of short- 
and long-term affects they might have, will have to be negotiated and, as already 
stressed, this process is rule- and value-guided. How open decision-making processes 
should be and how and to what degree hierarchies need to be broken down that 
impede self-critical and open decision-making processes, will also have to be further 
analyzed.  
The field gets even muddier with view to newly-emerging technologies. Traditionally, 
technologies and technical devices have been seen as artificial neutral tools that apply 
scientific knowledge in accordance with human purposes. Nanotechnology, new 
forms of prenatal genetic testing, germline and genome editing (CRISPR), genetic 
pharmacology and their applications (molecular-level individualized “repair” that can 
eradicate disease and “abnormalities” vectors, growing of human-animal chimeras for 
organ transplants, etc.) are challenging this perspective. For complex open systems, 
because of their interactions with environments, irreversibility is impossible, that is, 
the system cannot be restored to its original status before the new technologies. 
However, we might think we control certain processes based on risk extrapolation, 
but what kind of evidence do we have? Our technological abilities might be ahead of 
our scientific insights and the availability of evidence for decision-making. What 
about minor abnormalities in unexpressed genes of somatic cells and the possibility of 
spontaneous mutations? What if the experts cannot agree on what certain data mean? 
Can we really foresee what will be “positive” outcomes from “negative” ones? What 
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criteria to apply when determining this? Do we really know what is morally 
permissible or relevant and what should not be permitted? Even on the cellular level, 
we cannot foresee all possible interactions. Which tests and practices should become 
standard and “best practice” and recommended for whom and what conditions? What 
if, despite average skill level and “best practices,” things go wrong? – Is the intent to 
repair decisive or the “unsuccessful” outcome for the evaluation of the case? 
Admission of errors and apologies will have another dimension, too. – Who to and by 
whom? What about restitution? And, generally speaking, what norm is applied to 
distinguish normal from abnormal species-function? The common definition of 
disability, for instance, refers to something that is required or expected to perform in 
society (looks, skills and abilities). That makes this definition relational. (Medical 
Dictionary) If what is seen as aberration/not-normal depends on the understanding of  
“the” normal human being and of “life quality,” is “restoring” of the “normal” a right 
and not to do that a failure or a crime? What kinds of conditions will the physician 
have to anticipate and test for so that he or she cannot get accused of negligence? 
Does what is extraordinary, normal or mandatory need to be negotiated? Or is the 
medical profession simply correcting the individual’s genetic “bad luck,” when 
testing for and repairing particular aberrations from the “healthy norm” (physical 
deformity, disability, illness, or non-normal mental functions)? What to do with all 
the knowledge about genetic lineages and possible “aberrations” that is acquired? 
Considering the complexity of this knowledge, which is challenging even for the 
expert, how can the layperson understand what it means? Who should know what? – 
Only the patient or the whole family? What to do if someone does not want to know 
or is under-age? (Dickensen, 2003, pp. 172-174) Wouldn’t we need best 
communication practices or protocols, too, and a qualified genetic counseling service? 
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What is to be considered misuse of testing and knowledge and how can it be 
prevented?  
In case of prenatal tests and changes, how can the autonomy principle of bio-ethics be 
applied? – We won’t be able to ask future generations for permission. On what should 
the research and healing concentrate, rare conditions or spectacular illnesses or 
common ones? – We have limited funds. Moreover, with each of the new 
developments, new expectations are raised (and provided to the public) concerning 
what can become “standard treatment.” And age, ethnicity, genetic lineage, and 
gender could factor in, as do costs and resource distribution. This, in turn, raises 
issues of discrimination, social justice and fairness as well as the question of social-
political and individual culpabilities. (Denson, 2007, pp. 148-149; Cochran, & Kenny, 
2014; Yeo, 2009; Day, 2014) The new chances then come with choices that won’t be 
“innocent.”  
Before pointing out some conclusions, let me mention four more lines of questions 
that should be asked because of their links to the issue of mistakes. 
The first concerns the influence of the media on the perception of mistakes (as 
in the cases of the Ebola scare in Dallas and of debates in online forums) as well as 
the impact of advertisement (for new technologies and medicinal products and 
medications). If, in a patient-centered approach, the patient’s perception matters, the 
media would also be indirectly part of the patient’s evaluation of what counts as 
“good service,” error, and apology (Kennedy, & Overholzer, 2010; Halpern, J., 2001; 
Torrey, 2015; Irwin, 2015; Forde, & Wu, 2015). 
The second involves food. It is not “just” food availability that we should be 
concerned about but also what we eat, since the chemicals that we take in with and as 
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food do not only influence symptomatically but, also, treatment options (e.g., the 
efficacy of antibiotics; Combating Antibiotic Resistance, 2016).  
The third relates to the standards that apply in the vast array of alternatives to 
“school medicine” (from self help and the sale of brain stimulation devices to online 
Telemedicine) and in the beauty and cosmetics industries (from Botox injections, 
cosmetic fillers, intense Pulse Light and thermal wrinkle treatments to chemical peels 
and weight-loss programs) as well as in ancillary services of the health care industry 
(e.g., ambulance drivers, 911- operators) (Carter, & Forte, 2016). 
 The fourth is linked to globalization effects and the possibility of exposure to 
new, formerly unknown or “irrelevant” or neglected illnesses (e.g., Zika, Yellow 
Fever, and Ebola; Gostin, 2015). There are no books or safety checklists to follow. 
Conclusions 
1. It seems necessary to accept that the term medical error will always stay elusive to 
a degree. Focusing on more precise taxonomies, and based on it, the development and 
implementation of more rules and regulations, although helpful to improve systemic 
and individual behaviors, won’t solve the problem of their occurrence either. What is 
needed is a more realistic approach to uncertainty. Steps towards such would require 
to change the socio-political discourses on errors and uncertainties with regards our 
expectations towards science and technology in medical education and the health care 
professions and in society in general, without strengthening the dichotomic position 
that many people display who oscillate between blind trust and a “fix it” attitude or 
deep-seated distrust. (Valdesolo, 2014; Trust in, 2002) This discourse needs to focus 
on the understanding of the “no harm principle,” of care, vulnerability, collective 
responsibility, accountability, quality of life and a “good” life, good/normal/average 
health, illness, and disability. Moreover, people need to understand that measurability 
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does not guarantee objectivity and that tests, data collection and technology 
development are based on previous value decisions and, therefore, come with a 
particular focus. From the beginning, they have an ethical component, which concerns 
what is developed by whom for whom and what is not pursued. How are private and 
tax money spent? What other problems are not tackled and why? Furthermore, 
scientific knowledge, including medical, and medical standards have a high turnover 
rate (Freedman, 2010; Elvin, Edwards, Kinnersley, & Grol, 2000). 
2. If we want an accountable and responsive system, the issue of errors needs to be 
dealt with prospectively, interdisciplinary, with public input and transparent 
procedures and by considering long and short-term influences from what is not the 
“healthcare industry.” Since we are dealing with an open system, shifting the focus to 
local/regional “systems” and communities and their ability to become “islands of 
excellence” might be a promising way to tackle the problem (Bar-Yam, 2016, 
Gladwell, pp. 182-191, Sharpe, 2003, pp. 8-15; Forde, & Wu, 2015). This means, 
high-reliability organizations with an atmosphere of “collective mindfulness” 
(Manheimer, 2015, p. 139) and a higher level of decentralized decision-making and 
transparency that orients towards patient in-care and quality of life. The ideal would 
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